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WATER RIGHTS-FAILURE To USE-FORFEITURE*-In

an arid

state like New Mexico, the shortage of water requires maximum use
of all water available. Maximum use of water is thought to be promoted by imposing forfeiture of water rights when the water is not
used beneficially, thus making it available to a party who will use
this critical resource. In the past, New Mexico statutes have provided that non-use extending through four consecutive years will
result in forfeiture of water rights. 1 The 1965 session of the New
Mexico legislature has materially relaxed the forfeiture provisions
of water right statutes. The 1965 amendments provide that the
water right will not be forfeited unless the state engineer first gives
notice of non-use to the owner of the water right, and that after
notice the owner fails to beneficially use the water for one year.2
Other ways for a non-user to avoid forfeiture had been provided
* N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-5-26, -11-8 (Supp. 1965).
1. New Mexico has two water rights forfeiture statutes. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-26
(Supp. 1965) is the surface water forfeiture statute. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-11-8 (Supp.
1965) is the ground water forfeiture statute. Both statutes contain essentially the same
provisions. E.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-26 (Supp. 1965):
A. When the party entitled to the use of water fails to beneficially use all
or any part of the water claimed by him, for which a right of use has vested,
for the purpose for which it was appropriated or adjudicated, except the
waters for storage reservoirs, for a period of four years, such unused water
shall, if the failure to beneficially use the water persists one year after notice
and declaration of non-user given by the state engineer, revert to the public
and shall be regarded as unappropriated public water; provided, however,
that forfeiture shall not necessarily occur if circumstances beyond the control
of the owner have caused non-use, such that the water could not be placed to
beneficial use by diligent efforts of the owner; and Provided that periods of
non-use, when irrigated farm lands are placed under the acreage reserve
program or conservation program provided by the Soil Bank Act shall not be
computed as part of the four-year forfeiture period. Provided further that
the condition of notice and declaration of non-user shall not apply to water
which has reverted to the public by operation of law prior to June 1, 1965.
B. Upon application to the state engineer at any time and a proper showing
of reasonable cause for delay or for non-use, or upon the state engineer finding
that it is in the public interest, the state engineer may grant extensions of time,
not to exceed a term of one year for each extension, in which to apply to
beneficial use the water for which a permit to appropriate has been issued
or a water right has vested, was appropriated or has been adjudicated.
C. Periods of non-use when water rights are acquired by incorporated municipalities for implementation of their water development plans or for preservation of municipal water supplies shall not be computed as part of the fouryear forfeiture statute.
D. A lawful exemption from the requirements of beneficial use, either by an
extension of time or other statutory exemption, stops the running of the fouryear period for the period of the exemption, and the period of exemption shall
not be included in computing the four-year period.
2. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-5-26(a), -11-8(a) (Supp. 1965).
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by earlier amendments.' One exemption from forfeiture involves
conditions beyond the control of the owner that prevent use of
the water right.4 Also, lands placed under the acreage reserve program or conservation program of the Soil Bank Act 5 are excepted
from the forfeiture statute." The forfeiture statute allows the state
engineer to grant extensions of time to prevent forfeiture upon a
showing of reasonable cause, or in those cases in which forfeiture
would not serve the public interest.7
The amendment requiring the state engineer to give one-year
notice to the non-user thus gives the non-user another year to resume
the beneficial use of the water and materially moderates the effect
of the forfeiture statute." Consequently, the water right owner can
3. The amendment trend has been toward moderating application of the forfeiture
statute. Compare the present statute, set forth in note 1 supra, with the first surface
water forfeiture statute:
When the party entitled to the use of water fails to beneficially use all or
any part of the water claimed by him, for which a right of use has vested, for
the purpose for which it was appropriated or adjudicated, except the water
for storage reservoirs, for a period of four years, such unused water shall
revert to the public and shall be regarded as unappropriated public water.
N.M. Laws 1907, ch. 49, §42. The first ground water forfeiture statute, N.M. Laws
1931, ch. 131, § 8, was articulated in essentially the same manner. See Clark, New Mexico Water Law Since 1955, 2 Natural Resources J. 484, 493-94, 504 (1962).
4. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-5-26 (Supp. 1965). The amendment to the surface water
statute allowing this exemption was added by N.M. Laws 1941, ch. 126, § 16. Curiously,
the ground water statute makes no such provision. In Chavez v. Gutierrez, 54 N.M.
76, 82, 213 P.2d 597, 600 (1950), the supreme court, in applying the surface water forfeiture statute, said: "Our statutes recognize the unfairness in loss of a water right
through non-use where conditions beyond the control of the owner of such right
prevent [its] use."
5. 70 Stat. 188 (1956), 7 U.S.C. §§1801 to 1837 (1964).
6. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-5-26, -11-8 (Supp. 1965). The exception of the Soil Bank
Act lands was added to the surface water statute by N.M. Laws 1957, ch. 91, § 1, and
was added to the groundwater statute by N.M. Laws 1961, ch. 32, § 1.
7. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-5-26, -11-8 (Supp. 1965). The amendment allowing the
state engineer to grant extensions of time on a showing of good cause was added to
the surface water statute by N.M. Laws 1965, ch. 250, § 1, and was added to the
ground water statute by N.M. Laws 1959, ch. 7, § 1.
8. The language of the forfeiture statute permits the interpretation that the statute
is self-executing. The statute provides that the unused water shall revert to the public
after four years of non-use and when such non-use persists one year after notice by
the state engineer to the non-user. In other words, as soon as the conditions to forfeiture
are met, the water by operation of law reverts to the public. However, until the courts
declare a forfeiture, the loss of the water right is not a final determination. Prior to
the "notice amendment," the courts could declare a forfeiture on the running of the
four consecutive years non-use. The "notice amendment" requires, in addition to four
consecutive years of non-use, that the non-use persist for one year after notice by
the state engineer. When the notice year had passed, the courts could then declare a
forfeiture.
The forfeiture statute might be construed to give the state engineer authority
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refrain from using water indefinitely. His water right cannot be
forfeited until notice is given, and after notice he has a full year to
resume beneficial use of the water. Unless the water right owner
chooses to ignore the notice, forfeiture could never occur.
Several problems of statutory interpretation are created by the
amendment. It is uncertain when the state engineer can give effective
notice of non-use.' If the state engineer must wait to give notice until
the end of the fourth year of non-use, the legislature has created a
five-year limitation before forfeiture can occur. A better construction of the notice amendment is that notice and declaration of nonuse could be given by the state engineer at the end of the third year
of non-use.' 0 This construction would preserve the essential purpose
of the statute, that forfeiture will result from a failure to use water
for four consecutive years."
A third uncertainty created by the amendment arises when, after
four years of non-use, the non-user beneficially uses water during
the year he receives notice from the state engineer to avoid forfeiture, but at some future time ceases to make beneficial use of the
to adjudicate a forfeiture by administrative action. However, the state engineer has
indicated to the legislature that he lacks that authority because it would be an unconstitutional delegation of judicial powers. In practice, as a result of hydrologic surveys, the state engineer submits evidence to the court in an action to declare forfeiture.
This evidence may show that certain rights have been forfeited, and the court considers
the state engineer's evidence with all other evidence to determine whether the right has
been forfeited. If the state engineer, acting on an application to change the point of
diversion or place or purpose of use of a water right, has discovered forfeiture of that
water right from the record, and the granting of the permit to change the water would
impair existing rights, he will seek a declaratory judgment on the question of forfeiture. N.M. State Engineer Memorandum on House Bill 144, Feb. 1, 1965; N.M. State
Engineer Memorandum on House Judiciary Comm. Substitute for House Bill 144,
March 1, 1965. These memoranda, presented to the New Mexico legislature, relate to
proposed acts of the legislature pertaining to reinstatement of reverted water rights
in certain circumstances. See note 14 infra and accompanying text.
A question arises if the state engineer does not seek a declaratory judgment in this
situation. What is the validity of the state engineer's distinction between finding facts
conclusive of forfeiture rather than adjudicating forfeiture? Because the state engineer's findings of fact are binding on the district court, the distinction of finding facts
conclusive of forfeiture is not very useful. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-6-1 (1953), interpreted in Kelly v. Carlsbad Irr. Dist., 71 N.M. 464, 467, 379 P.2d 763, 764 (1963).
A noted author on New Mexico water law suggests that "there should be statutory
recognition of the State Engineer's power to make initial determination of rights as
the first step in the adjudicatory process." Clark, supra note 3, at 559. See also Clark,
New Mexico Water Resources Law 87 (Study No. 67, Div. of Gov't Research, Univ.
of N.M. 1964).
9. N.M. State Engineer Memorandum on House Judiciary Comm. Substitute for
House Bill 144, March 1, 1965.
10. Giving notice after the third year of non-use may not be the most desirable
procedure. See note 12 infra and accompanying text.
11. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-5-26, -11-8 (Supp. 1965).
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water. 12 Should the four-year period start anew after the owner has
once used the water to escape forfeiture? Or should forfeiture result from any subsequent failure to use the water? The intent of the
legislature is defeated by permitting the water right owner to use
water only once in every five years. Conversely, allowing any subsequent non-use to cause forfeiture would be extremely harsh. A solution to this problem would be to consider subsequent non-use sufficient to cause forfeiture unless the water right owner can show that
he had not re-used the water temporarily simply to avoid forfeiture,
rather than for a bona fide beneficial use. Placing the burden of proof
on the water right owner is preferable to placing it on the state. Intent is difficult to prove, and the water right owner is the one most
likely to possess evidence supporting his reasons for resuming beneficial use during the "notice" year and subsequently ceasing beneficial
use. Moreover, placing the burden on the water right owner emphasizes the legislative policy disfavoring the non-use of a critical
resource.
Although the New Mexico statutory provisions for forfeiture
have been relaxed, perhaps the result is not a serious burden on the
state's water policy. Two reasons prompt this suggestion: (1) the
statute is probably not retroactive, and (2) owners of water rights
are increasingly conscious of the value of these rights.
A literal interpretation of the statute lends support to its nonretroactive application. The forfeiture statute seems to be selfexecuting'-the water right reverts to the public by operation of
law when the conditions to forfeiture are met. The statute explicitly
relieves the state engineer of the duty to give one-year notice to nonusers whose water rights have so reverted prior to June 1, 1965.
One may conclude, therefore, that when four consecutive years of
non-use have occurred prior to June 1, 1965, the state engineer
would not have to give notice as a condition to forfeiture.
The significance of a non-retroactive application is illustrated
when the state engineer, seeking a determination of water rights
in a basin, claims that the water right owner has forfeited his right
12. For this problem to arise, four consecutive years of non-use must have passed
prior to resuming beneficial use during the fifth ("notice") year and a later non-use. If
the state engineer gives notice to the non-user after the third year and the non-user uses
water beneficially during the notice year, a subsequent failure to use water would
not cause forfeiture because there would not then be four consecutive years of non-use.
On the other hand, if notice were given after four years of consecutive non-use and the
non-user used water beneficially in the notice year to avoid forfeiture, a subsequent
failure to use water would cause forfeiture.
13. See note 8 supra.
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through non-use in some four-year period prior to June 1, 1965.
For example, in State ex rel. Reynolds v. Mitchell, 4 the water right
owner, without following the statutory procedure, had discontinued
irrigating from an authorized well and irrigated from an unauthorized new well for four consecutive years. The supreme court held
that the unauthorized change in well location and the subsequent
irrigation from the new well for four consecutive years resulted in a
legal forfeiture. If the notice amendment to the forfeiture statute
were retroactive, the state engineer could be required to give the
one-year notice in cases like Mitchell, even though the water right
had reverted to the public by four consecutive years of non-use occurring before June 1, 1965.
Forfeiture by non-use will occur less frequently as water right
owners recognize the market value of their water right." Reducing
non-use of water rights depends to a large degree on whether an
owner can sell his water right for fair price. If a water appropriator
is not in a position to use his water right, and cannot sell it, does
the state water policy justify declaring forfeiture? To answer this
question, the concept of forfeiture must be analyzed by balancing
the objectives of the state's water policy against the effects of forfeiture in different fact situations.
New Mexico water policy is set forth by the state constitution,
which provides that unappropriated water belongs to the public and
will be subject to appropriation for beneficial use.' 6 "Beneficial use
is the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to the use of
water.' 1 7 Therefore, New Mexico' and other states' have adopted
the policy of forfeiting water rights for the failure to use water
beneficially. The purpose of a water law has been defined as follows:
Water law should provide for maximum benefits from the use of
the resource, and this end should be reached by means of granting private property rights in water, secure enough to encourage development

and flexible enough for economic forces to change them to better
14. 66 N.M. 212, 345 P.2d 744 (1959). See also Durand v. Reynolds, 406 P.2d 817
(N.M. 1965).
15. Letter From S. E. Reynolds, New Mexico State Engineer, to Walter R. Parr,
Oct. 5, 1965.
16. N.M. Const. art 16, §§ 1, 2.
17. N.M. Const. art 16, § 3.
18. See 2 Kinney, Irrigation and Water Rights § 1118 (2d ed. 1912) ; Clark, New
Mexico Water Resources Law, op. cit. supra note 8, at 1-10.
19. E.g., Cal. Water Code § 1241; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-101 (1956) ; Ore. Rev.
Stat. § 540.610 (Supp. 1964).
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when private economic
uses, and subject to public regulation only
20
action does not protect the public interest.

The purpose of the2 forfeiture statute is to provide for maximum use
of available water. 1
To determine how it achieves the objectives of maximum use,
forfeiture must be analyzed in terms of the extent to which the basin
is appropriated and the efficiency of the market for water rights.
An efficient market for water rights is one in which there are buyers
offering prices which sellers are willing to accept. Conversely, an
inefficient water rights market is one in which buyers are not offering
prices which the seller is willing to accept. First, consider the effect
of forfeiture in an under-appropriated basin with an inefficient water
right market.2 2 An under-appropriated basin has more water available for use than is presently appropriated. If all existing appropriators are using their water rights, additional appropriations may be
made without fear of over-appropriating the basin. If, however,
some appropriators are not beneficially using their water, there is
a danger of allowing more appropriators in the basin than there
is water to meet these appropriations. For example, X has a valid
water right in an under-appropriated basin but is not using the water,
and Y applies for and obtains a water right. Under existing water
supplies the appropriation to Y, with X not using his share, brings
the basin to almost full capacity. If X begins to take his share after
the appropriation to Y, the basin would be over-appropriated, and
the most junior users would have their headgates closed. 3 Forfeiture
of X's paper water right prevents over-appropriation of the basin
and favors the interest of the new appropriator who relied on the
availability of water to meet his appropriation. 4
A second consideration is the effect of forfeiture in a fully appropriated basin with an inefficient water right market. When a non20. Trelease, Policies for Water Lawy: Property Rights, Economic Forces, and
Public Regulation, 5 Natural Resources J. 1, 2 (1965).
21. 2 Kinney, op. cit. supra note 18, at § 1118.
22. See Note, Forfeiture of Water Rights in Wyoming, 14 Wyo. L.J. 51 (1959).
The author of the note argues that the Wyoming forfeiture statute should be strengthened because the present interpretation has resulted in non-use of approximately
one-third of the existing rights. The present Wyoming interpretation is that forfeiture
can only be initiated by a junior appropriator who can show clearly that he will get
the water forfeited.
23. In unadjudicated basins in New Mexico, every user would suffer a proportionate reduction in his appropriation because the state engineer cannot enforce priorities
until water rights in the basin are authoritatively determined.
24. See Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 15 N.M. 666, 110 Pac. 1045 (1910).
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use occurs, the water to which the non-user is legally entitled flows
in small increments to other appropriators on the stream who may
or may not make the most beneficial use of the additional water. Because the basin is purportedly fully appropriated, any new application for water rights would be denied." For example, X has water
rights in the basin for 150 acres and has failed to use the water
for the statutory four-year period. The water he should have been
using is flowing in small increments to 300 other farms, some of
which will use the water more efficiently than others. Rather than
allow this additional water to flow to some inefficient use, the policy
of maximum use requires that it be given to a new appropriator
who will use the water more beneficially. Forfeiture then prevents
the inefficient use of the additional water.
A third consideration is the effect of forfeiture in an over-appropriated basin with an inefficient water right market. 26 That is, a
basin in which there are more appropriators than there is water, and
the prospect of the non-user reviving his right threatens the security
of the water supply to the junior appropriators in the basin with
existing uses. A declaration of forfeiture makes the right more
secure because it prevents the reactivation of the paper water right.
A final consideration is the effect of forfeiture when the water
right market is efficient. If a water right market is efficient, the
degree of appropriation of the basin, the amount of water in the appropriation, and the priority of the appropriation are reflected in
the price of the water right. For example, X has an adjudicated
water right with a 1934 priority which gives him two acre-feet for
150 acres. If X is trying to sell his water right and forfeiture occurs
while he is waiting for the market to ripen, the valuable water right
is destroyed and the water is made available at virtually no cost to
other appropriators. Forfeiture also deprives X of the sale price
of his water right, and the would-be buyer of X's water right is deprived of the 1934 priority. But if no forfeiture occurs, the water
right would go to the most beneficial user because he would pay the
25. N.M. Stat. Ann. §75-5-6 (1953). Section 75-5-6 requires the state engineer to
reject an application to appropriate water if there is no unappropriated water available for the benefit of the applicant. The statute also provides that the state engineer
may refuse to consider or approve an application if in his opinion the approval would
be contrary to the public interest.
26. See Bagley, Some Economic Considerations in Water Use Policy, 5 Kan. L. Rev.
499, 515 (1957): "[F]orfeiture procedures may result in actually encouraging water
users to actually exercise their rights to the fullest whether they need it or not, in order
to protect this right."
27. Trelease, supra note 20, at 47.
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highest price. The argument against forfeiture in this situation can
be expressed as follows:
From the standpoint of economic logic there appears to be little
reason for stipulating that non-use of a water right may be the basis

for losing the right. To assert that water is scarce and valuable and
that therefore it should be used is no real reason for taking away a
water right for non-use. The solution is economic, not legislative or
judicial. If water is scarce and if the right is clearly defined, the
water right will have a money value so that the owner of the right
28
should have the opportunity to sell his right or water to other users.
Forfeiture accomplishes its objective of maximum use in an inefficient water right market. However, in an efficient water right
market it is an economic solution that obtains the maximum use of
the available water 2 -the non-user owner will have the opportunity
to sell his right, rather than suffer needless forfeiture. In New Mexico the water rights system has not had an opportunity to operate
in a climate of fully adjudicated water rights. Without adjudication
of water rights, an economic solution to the problem is complicated:
The water right is not defined clearly enough for the seller to know
what he is selling, nor can the buyer know the exact nature of the
right he is buying. Until private economic decisions can operate with
certainty, New Mexico's water policy is best served by an effective
forfeiture statute.
WALTER R. PARR

28. Milliman, Water Law and Private Decision Making, 2 J. Law & Econ. 41, 49
(1959).
29. An economic solution to non-use provides more than maximum use of available
water. It allows the water to be transferred to a more efficient use, because the most
efficient user will pay a higher price for the water right. Conversely, forfeiture is limited
to a quantitative approach rather than a qualitative aproach. In other words, forfeiture
can only prevent non-use.

